This is what I was wondering about! Good to know the exact cost of all of this upgrades.The cost would be more manageable if the upgrades are not taken to the max as the last upgrade is always so much more,and if we only pick the most important uogrades too.
Margarete Goerne ( m. 1913)ChildrenOther workSeeSignatureHeinz Wilhelm Guderian ( German:; 17 June 1888 – 14 May 1954) was a German general during who, after the war, became a successful memoirist. An early pioneer and advocate of the ' approach, he played a central role in the development of the concept. In 1936, he became the Inspector of Motorized Troops.At the beginning of the Second World War, Guderian led an in the.
During the, he commanded the armoured units that attacked through the forest and overwhelmed the Allied defenses at the. He led the during, the invasion of the. The campaign ended in failure after the German offensive failed to capture, after which Guderian was dismissed.In early 1943, Adolf Hitler appointed Guderian to the newly created position of Inspector General of Armoured Troops. In this role, he had broad responsibility to rebuild and train new but saw limited success due to Germany's worsening war economy. Guderian was appointed Acting Chief of the General Staff of the, immediately following the to assassinate Hitler.Guderian was placed in charge of the 'Court of Honour' by Hitler, which in the aftermath of the plot was used to dismiss people from the military so they could be tried in the ' and executed. He was Hitler's personal advisor on the and became closely associated with the Nazi regime. Guderian's troops carried out the criminal during Barbarossa, and he was implicated in the commission of reprisals after the of 1944.Guderian surrendered to the United States forces on 10 May 1945 and was interned until 1948.
He was released without charge and retired to write his memoirs. Entitled, the autobiography became a bestseller, widely read to this day. Guderian's writings promoted several post-war myths, including that of the '.
In his autobiography, Guderian portrayed himself as the sole originator of the German panzer force; he omitted any mention of his relationship with Hitler and the Nazi regime or of war crimes. Guderian died in 1954 and was buried in. Contents.Early life and World War I Guderian was born in, (now Poland), on 17 June 1888, the son of Friedrich and Clara ( Kirchoff). His father and grandfathers were Prussian officers and he grew up in garrison towns surrounded by the military. In 1903, he left home and enrolled at a military cadet school. He was a capable student, although he performed poorly in his final exam. He entered the army as an in February 1907 with the 10th Hanoverian Light Infantry Battalion, under his father's command.
He became a in January 1908. On 1 October 1913, he married Margarete Goerne with whom he had two sons, (2 August 1914 – 2004) and Kurt (17 September 1918 – 1984).At the outbreak of World War I Guderian served as a communications officer and the commander of a radio station. In November 1914, he was promoted to. Between May 1915 and January 1916, Guderian was in charge of signals intelligence for the. He fought at the during this period and was promoted to on 15 November 1915.
He was then sent to the 4th Infantry Division before becoming commander of the Second of Infantry 14. On 28 February 1918, Guderian was appointed to the Corps.
Guderian finished the war as an operations officer in occupied Italy. He disagreed with Germany signing the armistice in 1918, believing that the should have continued the fight. Interwar period. Guderian, left, in Sweden, 1929Early in 1919, Guderian was selected as one of the four thousand officers allowed by the in the reduced-size German army, the. He was assigned to serve on the staff of the central command of the Eastern Frontier Guard Service which was intended to control and coordinate the independent units in the defense of Germany's eastern frontiers against Polish and Soviet forces engaged in the.
In June 1919, Guderian joined the Iron Brigade (later known as the ) as its second General Staff officer.In the 1920s Guderian was introduced to armored warfare tactics by, a World War I tank commander and a prolific writer on the subject. He studied the leading European literature on armored warfare and between 1922 and 1928 wrote five papers for Military Weekly, an armed forces journal. While the topics covered were mundane, Guderian related them to why Germany had lost World War I, a controversial subject at the time, and thus raised his profile in the military. There were some trial maneuvers conducted in the and Guderian academically evaluated the results. Britain was experimenting with armoured units under General, and Guderian kept abreast of Hobart's writings. In 1924, he was appointed as an instructor and military historian at. As a lecturer he was polarizing, some of his pupils enjoyed his wit, but he alienated others with his biting sarcasm.In 1927, Guderian was promoted to major and in October he was posted to the transport section of the, a clandestine form of the army's General Staff, which had been forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles.
By the autumn of 1928, he was a leading speaker on tanks; however, he did not set foot in one until the summer of 1929 when he briefly drove a Swedish. In October 1928, he was transferred to the Motor Transport Instruction Staff to teach. In 1931, he was promoted to lieutenant-colonel and became chief of staff to the Inspectorate of Motorized Troops under. This placed Guderian at the center of Germany's development of mobile warfare and armored forces. Panzer Division and mobile warfare. Guderian with an in a half-track being used as a mobile command center during the Battle of France, 1940Guderian was involved in the strategic debates that preceded the invasion of France and the Low Countries.
The plan was being developed by his classmate at the 1907 War Academy,. The shifted the weight of the armoured formations away from a head-on attack through the Low Countries to one through the Ardennes. Guderian confidently proclaimed the feasibility of taking armor through the hilly and was subsequently told he may have to command the spearhead of the attack himself. He then complained about the lack of resources until he was given seven mechanized divisions with which to accomplish the task. The plan established a force for the penetration of the forest that comprised the largest concentration of German armor to that date; 1,112 out of Germany's total of 2,438 tanks.Guderian's corps spearheaded the drive through the Ardennes and over the. He led the attack that broke the French lines at the.
Guderian's panzer group led the 'race to the sea', ending with the (BEF) and French forces trapped at. A British counter-attack at on 21 May slowed down the German advance and allowed BEF to establish defenses around points of evacuation, while Hitler, conscious of potential reverses and of allowing unsupported armor into urban fighting, issued the order to halt. A general resumption of the attack was ordered on 26 May, but by that time the Allied forces rallied offering stiff resistance. On 28 May, with his losses mounting, Guderian advised the abandonment of the armoured assault in favor of a traditional artillery-infantry operation. Guderian was then ordered to.
The offensive started at the on 9 June and finished on 17 June with the encirclement of the defences and the remaining French forces.Despite the success of the invasion, French defeat was not inevitable; the French had better, more numerous military equipment and were not overwhelmed by a numerically or technologically superior military force. Instead, the French loss stemmed from poor army morale, faulty military strategy and a lack of coordination among Allied troops. Hitler and his generals became over-confident after their historic victory, and came to believe they could defeat the Soviet Union, a country with significantly more natural resources, manpower and industrial capacity.
Invasion of the Soviet Union. Nose goes image. Guderian visiting a panzer regiment at the frontlines, August 1941By 15 September, German forces including the and 2nd Panzer Groups had completed the largest in history, the. Owing to the 2nd Panzer Group's southward turn during the battle, the Wehrmacht destroyed the entire east of, inflicting over 600,000 losses on the by 26 September. However, the campaign had been costly; the German forces had just half the tanks they had three months earlier.
They were bogged down in a war of attrition for which the Wehrmacht was not prepared. Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group was in the worst shape; it had just 21 per cent of its tanks in working order. In mid-September, he was ordered to make a drive for Moscow. On 30 September the began. On 4 October, the, part of the 2nd Panzer Group suffered a severe setback at, near.
Guderian demanded an inquiry into the realities of tank warfare on the Eastern Front, eventually suggesting in November to senior German tank designers and manufacturers that the quickest solution was to produce a direct copy of the Soviet tank.By November, the attack by the 2nd Panzer Group on and, 125 km (78 mi) south of Moscow, achieved limited success, while Guderian vacillated between despair and optimism, depending on the situation at the front. Facing pressure from the German High Command, Field Marshal finally committed the weaker south flank of his to the attack on 1 December.
In the aftermath of the battle, Guderian blamed slow commitment of 4th Army to the attack for the German failure to reach Moscow. This assessment grossly overestimated the capabilities of Kluge's remaining forces. It also failed to appreciate the reality that Moscow was a metropolis that German forces lacked the numbers to either encircle or to capture in a frontal assault. In the aftermath of the German failure, Guderian refused to pass on Hitler's 'stand fast' order and fell out with Kluge, the new commander of the Army Group Centre.
Guderian was relieved of command on 25 December.The German formations on the Eastern Front ubiquitously implemented the criminal and the. For all divisions within Guderian's panzer group where files are preserved, there is evidence of illegal against the civilian population. In his memoirs, Guderian denied having given the Commissar Order. However, General, a corps commander within Guderian's panzer group, is documented as saying 'prisoners, who could be shown to have been, had to be immediately taken aside and shot' – and that the order came directly from Guderian. Reporting to the OKW, Guderian is documented as saying his panzer group had 'shunted off' 170 commissars by the beginning of August. Inspector General of Armoured Troops. Guderian being transported to the Eastern Front, 1943On 1 March 1943, after the German defeat in the, Hitler appointed Guderian to the newly created position of Inspector General of Armoured Troops.
The latter had successfully lobbied to be reinstated, resulting in the new posting. Guderian's responsibilities were to oversee the and the training of Germany's panzer forces. He established a collaborative relationship with regarding the manufacture and development of. The military failures of 1943 prevented Guderian from restoring combat power to the armored forces to any significant degree.
He had limited success with improved and fixing flaws in the third generation of tanks, the and the., the last major German offensive operation in the east, was an attempt by the German army to regain the initiative. Guderian opposed the offensive.
In a conversation with Hitler prior to the offensive, Guderian said: 'Why are we attacking in the east at all this year?' Hitler responded, 'You are right. Whenever I think of this attack, my stomach turns over.' Guderian concluded, 'Then you have the right attitude towards this situation. Leave it alone.' Guderian denied any involvement with the to assassinate Hitler in 1944.
Hart argues that there is strong circumstantial evidence that Guderian supported it: he had recommended appoint leading conspirator to become the 's chief of staff which would have given him direct access to Hitler; he delayed the mobilization of vehicles which implicitly assisted the plot; and he unexpectedly retired to his estate on the day of the assassination attempt. Hart writes that he was playing both sides; he was aware of the plot and implicitly assisted, but provided himself with an alibi by being on his estate should it fail.
He communicated with the conspirators through his deputy, who was already part of the conspiracy. Guderian may have briefly fallen under suspicion; however, the same day Hitler, still dazed from the blast, promoted him to Acting Chief of the Army General Staff (the ). Hart surmises had the plot succeeded then Guderian would have supported the new regime and demanded a significant promotion as a reward for his assistance. Acting Chief of Army General Staff. Main article:Battistelli writes that Guderian rewrote history in his memoirs, but notes that the biggest re-writing of history comes not in his putative fathering of the panzer force but in the cover-up of his culpability for war crimes during Operation Barbarossa.
Units under his command carried out the, which entailed the murder of Red Army political officers. He also played a large role in the commission of reprisals after the of 1944.Like other generals, Guderian's memoirs emphasized his loyalty to Germany and the German people; however, he neglected to mention that Hitler, including landed estates and a monthly payment of 2,000. Guderian wrote in his memoirs that he had been given a Polish estate as a retirement gift. Worth 1.24 million Reichsmarks, the estate covered an area of 2,000 acres (810 ha) and it was located at Deipenhof (now, Poland) in the. The occupants had been evicted. Guderian also did not mention that he had initially requested an estate three times larger, but he was turned down by the local, with support from Himmler. The Gauleiter balked at giving such an opulent estate to someone with the rank of only a Colonel-General.In 1950, Guderian published a pamphlet entitled Can Europe Be Defended?, where he lamented that the Western powers had picked the wrong side to ally themselves with during the war, even as Germany 'was fighting for its naked existence', as a 'defender of Europe' against the supposed Bolshevik menace.
Guderian issued apologetics for Hitler, writing: 'For one may judge Hitler's acts as one will, in retrospect his struggle was about Europe, even if he made dreadful mistakes and errors'. He claimed that only the Nazi civilian administration (not the Wehrmacht) was responsible for atrocities against Soviet civilians and scapegoated Hitler and the for the Wehrmacht's military reverses, as he later did in Panzer Leader.and, in their book, conclude that Guderian's memoirs are full of 'egregious untruths, half truths, and omissions', as well as outright 'nonsense'. Guderian's claimed, contrary to historical evidence, that the criminal Commissar Order was not carried out by his troops because it 'never reached his panzer group'. He also lied about the that preemptively exempted German troops from prosecution for crimes committed against Soviet civilians, claiming that it was never carried out either. Guderian claimed to have been solicitous towards the civilian population, that he took pains to preserve Russian cultural objects, and that his troops had 'liberated' the Soviet citizens.writes that English-speaking historians too readily presented a distorted image of German generals in the post-war era. In his book Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East, Stahel wrote: 'The men in control of Hitler's armies were not honourable men, carrying out their orders as dutiful servants of the state. With resolute support for the regime, the generals unquestioningly waged one war of aggression after the other, and, once Barbarossa began, willingly partook in the genocide of the Nazi regime'.
In popular culture. A postcard used to publicize Guderian during the warGuderian's memoirs remain popular. The favourable descriptions started with the British journalist and military theorist Liddell Hart, who described Guderian as one of the 'Great Captains of History', in a book published by the mass-market in 1957. As late as 2002, for the 55th anniversary of the first publication of the book, The New York Times, Newsweek, The New Yorker and other outlets published positive reviews, reinforcing the tenets of the.
The reviews stressed the separation between the professional soldiers and the Nazi regime, while The New York Times Book Review described the book as one of the best written by former German generals. In his biography eulogized Guderian, inflating his true accomplishments.In 1976, the leading magazine, spotlighted Guderian in a featured game of the month called Panzergruppe Guderian. The magazine cover included a photo of Guderian in military dress, with his Knight's Cross and a pair of binoculars, suggesting a commanding role.
The magazine featured a glowing profile of Guderian where he was identified as the originator of blitzkrieg and lauded for his military achievements. Adhering to the post-war myths, the profile posited that a commander like this could 'function in any political climate and be unaffected by it'. Guderian thus came across as a consummate professional who stood apart from the crimes of the Nazi regime. Works. Guderian, Heinz (1937).
(reissue ed.). Sterling Press.
Guderian reviews the development of armoured forces in the European nations and Soviet Russia, and describes what he felt was essential for the effective use of armoured forces. Guderian, Heinz (1942). Mit Den Panzern in Ost und West With the Panzers in the East and West. Volk & Reich Verlag. Guderian, Heinz (1950).
Kann Westeuropa verteidigt werden? Can Western Europe Be Defended?. Plesse-Verlag. Guderian, Heinz (1952). Da Capo Press Reissue edition, 2001. Originally published in German, titled Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Memories of a Soldier) ( , Heidelberg 1950; 10th edition 1977).References Citations.
Division of Europe in May 1941The Soviet offensive plans controversy was a debate among historians in the late 20th and early 21st centuries as to whether leader planned to attack forces in Eastern Europe during, prior to. Most historians agreed that the geopolitical differences between the Soviet Union and the Axis made war inevitable, and that Stalin had made extensive preparations for war and exploited the military conflict in Europe to his advantage.A number of historians and popular writers have discussed this issue. And authored books debunking claims of, a former military intelligence agent. The idea that Stalin was preparing to invade Germany received some support from, and.A number of German historians have debunked the claim that Operation Barbarossa was a preemptive strike. Such as, and, they also acknowledge the soviets were aggressive to their neighbors. Contents.Background Immediately after the (during ), asserted that the Soviet had prepared for an offensive war in Europe and he justified the German invasion as a.
After World War II, some leaders (including ) supported this view. Suvorov, Icebreaker, and the 1980s Vladimir Rezun, a former officer of the and a defector to the UK, considered the claim in his 1987 book, published in Russian under the pseudonym and again in several subsequent books. He argued that Soviet ground forces were well-organized and mobilized en masse along the for a Soviet invasion of Europe slated for Sunday, July 6, 1941 but were unprepared to defend their own territory.Suvorov claimed that maps and phrasebooks related to such an attack were issued to Soviet troops. Military topographic maps, unlike other military supplies, are strictly local and cannot be used elsewhere than in the intended operational area. Suvorov claims that Soviet units were issued with maps of Germany and German-occupied territory, and phrasebooks including questions about offices—SA offices were found only in German territory proper. In contrast, maps of Soviet territory were scarce.
Notably, after the German attack, the officer responsible for maps, Lieutenant General M.K. Kudryavtsev, was not punished by Stalin, who was known for extreme punishments after failures to obey his orders.
According to Suvorov, this demonstrates that Kudryavtsev was obeying the orders of Stalin, who did not expect a German attack.Suvorov also offered as evidence that Stalin took extensive efforts to conceal the general mobilization by manipulating the laws setting the age. This enabled Stalin to ensure an expansive build-up of the Red Army.
Since there was no universal military draft in the Soviet Union until 1939, by enacting the universal military draft on 1 September 1939 (the date had begun), and by changing the minimum age for joining the Red Army from 21 to 18, Stalin gained a dramatic increase in the military strength of the Red Army.This specific law on mobilization allowed the Red Army to increase its army of 1,871,600 men in 1939 to 5,081,000 in the spring of 1941, under secrecy, to avoid alarming the rest of the world. Eighteen million reservists were also drafted. The duration of service was 2 years. Thus, according to supporters of this theory, the Red Army had to enter a war by 1 September 1941 or the drafted soldiers would have to be released from service.Points Suvorov's main points include the following:.
The Soviet Union was intrinsically unstable. It had to expand to survive.
According to Suvorov's interpretation of the theory, the communist system had to expand and occupy the entire world to survive. Otherwise, the system would fail in a peaceful and/or military struggle with surrounding 'capitalist' countries. Stalin and other Soviet leaders opposed this and high-ranking officials who supported 'permanent revolution' were purged from the of the Soviet Union. Stalin publicly declared that 'the ultimate victory of socialism. Can only be achieved on an international scale'. Under this theory, Soviet leaders therefore started preparations for a large-scale war of aggression.
They officially declared an adherence to the theory of ', according to which Socialism can win in a single country, without being immediately overthrown by hostile capitalist neighbors. This leading country would then help revolutionary movements in other countries. Either way, the Soviet pre-war doctrine was based on the theory that will be overthrown through. The Soviet Union made extensive preparations for a future war of aggression during the 1920s and 1930s. Suvorov provides an extensive analysis of Stalin's preparations for war.
According to Suvorov, there were supposed to be three phases that would prepare the Soviet Union for war. The first one was to be focused on, the second focused on industrialisation, and the third phase would emphasize the militarisation of the country. Stalin escalated tensions in Europe by providing a combination of economic and military support to, and later to (see ). After World War I, the attempted to impose severe restrictions on Weimar Germany to prevent it from rearming and again becoming a significant military competitor. During 'the early 1920s until 1933, the Soviet Union was engaged in secret collaboration with the German military to enable it to circumvent the provisions of the ', which limited Germany's military production. Moscow allowed the Germans to produce and test their weapons on Soviet territory, while some Red Army officers attended general-staff courses in Germany. The basis for this collaboration was the, signed between the two nations in 1922, and subsequent diplomatic interactions.
This collaboration ended when the anti-communist Nazis took power in 1933. But, according to Suvorov, in the years 1932–1933, 'Stalin helped Hitler come to power by forbidding to make common cause with the against the Nazis in parliamentary elections'. Suvorov claims that Stalin's plan and vision was that Hitler's predictability and his violent reactionary ideas made him a candidate for the role of ' for the Communist revolution. By starting wars with European countries, Hitler would validate the USSR's entry into World War II by attacking Nazi Germany and 'liberating' and Sovietising all of Europe. When concluding the in 1939, Stalin 'clearly counted on the repetition of the, which would leave the 'capitalist' countries so exhausted that the USSR could sweep into Europe virtually unopposed' (see also ). According to Suvorov and others, Stalin always planned to exploit military conflict between the capitalist countries to his advantage. He said as early as 1925 that 'Struggles, conflicts and wars among our enemies are.our great ally.and the greatest supporter of our government and our revolution' and 'If a war does break out, we will not sit with folded arms – we will have to take the field, but we will be last to do so.
And we shall do so in order to throw the decisive load on the scale'. World War II was initiated by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, which became co-belligerents after signing the.
The essence of this pact was in the secret protocols which divided Europe into spheres of influence, and removed the Polish buffer between Germany and the USSR. Some countries that fell into the Soviet – and – were. The difference between these smaller nations, occupied and annexed by the USSR, and Poland (which was ) was that Poland had military assistance guarantees from and.
Stalin planned to attack Nazi Germany from the rear in July 1941, only a few weeks after the date on which the invasion of the Soviet Union took place. According to Suvorov, the Red Army had already redeployed from a defensive to an offensive stance. Suvorov also states that Stalin had made no major defensive preparations.
Hitler's intelligence identified the USSR's preparations to attack Germany. Therefore, the Wehrmacht had drafted a plan based on Hitler's orders as early as mid-1940, soon after the Soviet annexations of. (in English) Original reports and pictures from The Times. (in English) and on a website. (in English) —Covers the invasion of Russia including Operation Barbarossa. (in English) —Detailed analysis of the operation by author Bevin Alexander.
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(in English) Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence., 28 October 1959. (in English) by. (in English). (in English) at Vincent Ferraro's web site (published in World Affairs (1996) vol. 158, no. 4. (in English). (in German). (in Romanian) Andreea Tudorica, Ovidiu Ciutescu, Corina Andriuta, June 26, 2007.
(in Russian).